The README grew alongside the tool and ended up in the order the work happened rather than the order a reader needs. Three things were wrong with it. The two-tier split was implicit, so a reader had to sort out which paragraphs applied to the host they were building. The opening defined the whole tool as "no Docker socket in job containers, and deny-by-default egress", which describes one tier only - someone building the other was told it does things it deliberately will not do. And long-form justification sat between the reader and the steps. So the README is now tier-first: pick a tier from a comparison table, then follow only that tier's half. Everything that is background rather than instruction moved to docs/reference.md, with docs/README.md indexing it and the Proxmox runbook. The runbook stays in proxmox/ beside the firewall template it explains. The tier names changed with it. `ci` and `runtime` were dejima's words for these hosts: `ci` distinguishes nothing on a tool whose whole subject is CI, and `runtime` only means something if you already know dejima's runtime tests are the workload that forced the tier to exist. They are `confined` and `privileged` now, after what a job on each is granted. The distinction that generalises is where the security boundary sits - inside the host for one, on the hypervisor for the other - and the table leads with it. `unprivileged`/`privileged` would have been the more standard pairing and was rejected: two characters apart on a flag where a misread silently produces a host that looks hardened and is not. The old --role values still work and say what they are now called rather than translating silently. examples/ is renamed to match on both sides, so no file's tier is implied by the absence of a suffix, and the config mounts in the compose files follow. Written down explicitly for the first time: the privileged tier has no egress allowlist by design. Its jobs hold the socket and run in the host's network namespace, so any filter installed there is one they can flush. Installing it anyway would leave a host that looks like it has an allowlist, which is worse than one that plainly does not. Also adds GPL-3.0-or-later to match dejima: LICENSE plus SPDX headers on the scripts. bats test/ passes, 21/21. All four --role values and an invalid one behave as intended; the compose and act_runner examples still parse.
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Documentation
The README is the whole of the setup. Everything here is background, deeper explanation, or the reasoning behind a decision that looks arbitrary from outside.
| reference.md | The two settings named docker.sock, CONFIG_FILE and why an edit can appear to do nothing, the /data volume, compose networks against job networks, whether several runners should share a job network, why the privileged runner is separate, why public egress is not restricted on the node, why the resolver is set per-runner, the cache server |
| ../proxmox/README.md | Building the sacrificial VM: node firewall rules and the order they go in, bootstrap, snapshotting clean, and the scheduled rollback |
| ../proxmox/firewall.fw.template | The same node firewall as one annotated file, easier to review in one piece than as a table. Reference, not something to install |
One document lives outside this repository: dejima's docs/ci.md, which
covers why a CI run needs any of this over a sandbox, and why no approval gate
is offered. You do not need it to follow the README.