2fcde556da6f8bea5643c7b537ba5792d1f8f4bc
Section 4 no longer automates anything. A CI runner is rebuilt on a timer because nothing on it is worth keeping; a devbox holds uncommitted work, so a rollback on a cadence destroys the thing the machine exists to hold. What replaces it is pushing more often, knowing the rebuild cost by having paid it once, and keeping credentials off the box so a rebuild is the whole of the recovery. The rules go from eight to ten. The forge gains tcp/22 because a devbox pushes over SSH, and inbound becomes two client-subnet lists rather than one management host, with the front door on the narrower of the two. That last one is not the intuitive way round, so it is argued rather than asserted: both services put a terminal in front of whoever reaches them, and they differ only in what stands in front, where a public key beats basic auth with no rate limiting. The from-inside verification probes the default gateway rather than another host on the LAN. Naming another host would write down something worth attacking on the machine this page assumes will be owned; the gateway is already in the routing table, is guaranteed alive, and must be unreachable as a destination while traffic through it is untouched. It also carries the note that silence proves nothing when nothing else is getting through, which is why the audit reports three outcomes.
Description
Hardens a development VM, bounds what it can reach on your network if compromised, and tells you what that bound actually is
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