Stop inviting the isolated mode to be used for untrusted work

The pointer to security.md said it was worth reading "before using this for
anything you would not run against your own checkout", which reads as an
offer the threat model does not make: its stated premise is that the
project is one you already trust, and nothing about this flag changes that.
It narrows what a session can read of the host and what credential it
carries, which is not the same claim.
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2026-10-11 01:01:49 -07:00
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@@ -1135,8 +1135,7 @@ Withholding that key too, for any launch whose workflow never pushes, is
**Why each of those is the way it is**, and why this is a narrower blast
radius rather than a stronger sandbox, is in
[docs/security.md](security.md#a-session-with-no-project-mounted). Worth
reading before using this for anything you would not run against your own
checkout.
reading before relying on this mode.
## Reading what a session left behind