Stop inviting the isolated mode to be used for untrusted work
The pointer to security.md said it was worth reading "before using this for anything you would not run against your own checkout", which reads as an offer the threat model does not make: its stated premise is that the project is one you already trust, and nothing about this flag changes that. It narrows what a session can read of the host and what credential it carries, which is not the same claim.
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@@ -1135,8 +1135,7 @@ Withholding that key too, for any launch whose workflow never pushes, is
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**Why each of those is the way it is**, and why this is a narrower blast
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radius rather than a stronger sandbox, is in
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[docs/security.md](security.md#a-session-with-no-project-mounted). Worth
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reading before using this for anything you would not run against your own
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checkout.
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reading before relying on this mode.
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## Reading what a session left behind
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